The vast majority of research into the economic impacts of sports stadiums and franchises fail to find any evidence of positive contributions of professional sports teams or stadium construction to employment, wages/salaries and economic growth. In this study, the case of a New Zealand city, Wellington, is considered, and econometric models of employment growth and wage growth are developed to examine the role of recent stadium construction on the local economy, using quarterly data from 1989-2003. Results from this study found that despite its financial successes, the construction of the Westpac Stadium failed to stimulate either employment growth or wage growth. Results also indicated that stadium construction merely kept employment growth and wage growth in a holding pattern, as significant reductions in both wage and employment growth were experienced post-construction.
INTRODUCTION
The area of research that has focused on evaluating the economic effects of sports and stadiums in particular is notable for the "virtual unanimity" of findings that suggest that stadiums do not boost an economy in terms of income, employment or growth (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000) . To date, however, the vast majority of this quantitative research has been conducted in the United States, where the sporting landscape is quite different in nature to sports in other countries.
In this study, the case of Wellington, New Zealand is considered. Construction on the Westpac Stadium took place between 1997 and 1999. This research considers the following question: as a vehicle for employment and wage growth, how did the Stadium fare as an investment for Wellington? It is found that, relative to similar projects overseas, Wellington's new stadium compared favourably from a financial perspective. Performance from an economic perspective, however, needs to be examined in more depth. This paper begins with an overview of stadium activity in an international sense, and then the New Zealand scene is detailed, with particular emphasis on the Westpac Stadium in Wellington. The literature of the economic effects of stadium construction is reviewed, and then the methodology and data of the study are presented. The evaluation and discussion of the results and the implications and future directions for study round out the paper.
STADIUMS: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
In France, the Stade de France was built from September 1995 to November 1997 for the 1998 Soccer World Cup finals. It was built in the Paris suburb of Plaine-SaintDenis, previously a heavily industrialised area.
1 Despite a dream beginning publicitywise, Newman and Tual (2002) noted that the impacts of the stadium were uneven in nature. The Stade de France proved successful in attracting quality events, including hosting soccer and rugby internationals and opera and pop concerts. It was even a major part of Paris's bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, such was its success. In contrast, it was noted that the stadium provided little by way of employment, areas of severe deprivation remained in Plaine-Saint-Denis, and long-term unemployment increased after stadium construction (Newman and Tual, 2002) .
In Cardiff, the construction of the £130 million Millennium Stadium was supported by a £40 million national lottery grant with the rest being obtained by a commercial loan (Jones, 2002) . The new stadium replaced the old Cardiff Arms Park National Stadium, long-term home of Welsh rugby. It staged matches in the 1999 Rugby World Cup, which was jointly hosted in the United Kingdom, Ireland and France. In addition to the World Cup, the Millennium Stadium has been utilized to a greater degree than the Arms Park was, with national rugby, club rugby, soccer and speedway, among others, making for an ongoing regular schedule of events (Jones, 2002) . As the Millennium Stadium served a national rather than civic need, as it was owned by sporting bodies and not private teams, and those sporting bodies were longterm tenants, the effect of the stadium would be expected to be quite different to the outcomes experienced in the United States (Jones, 2002) . However Jones (2002) noted that 2001 research indicated that around half of city centre users were unlikely 1 It was the ground where France won the World Cup Final in 1998, defeating Brazil 3-0. 2 3 to shop there during event days because of concerns over antisocial behaviour, crowds and transport.
Recent construction in Australia has included Melbourne's $A425 million Colonial Stadium, a major project in the redevelopment of the Docklands area in Melbourne. A consortium of private investors, including News Corp and the Seven television network, built the stadium and redeveloped an adjacent area (Searle, 2002) . Searle (2002) noted that a lack of off-season activity and lower than expected attendances resulted in a pre-tax loss of $A41.2 million in the stadium's first financial year, and the value of the stadium was written down by $A156 million. The Melbourne Cricket Ground, Melbourne's largest stadium, is currently being upgraded for the 2006 Commonwealth Games to the tune of $A425 million, which included a $75 million contribution from the State Government.
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In Adelaide, the upgrade of Hindmarsh Soccer Stadium exceeded initial estimates by over 250% to $A30 million, the costs of which were borne by the state government (Searle, 2002) . The costs of upgrading Bruce Stadium in Canberra also exceeded initial expectations by over 100% to a final cost of $A60 million, with local taxpayers liable for $A64 million (Searle, 2002) . In Sydney, the stadium built for hosting the 2000 Olympics, the $A463 million Stadium Australia, was opened in 1999, with $A135 million in State funding. For most months the stadium was empty, with insufficient sporting events or rock concerts in Sydney to sustain the 80,000 seat stadium (Searle, 2002) . The stadium ran at an $A24 million loss in its first financial year, $A11 million in its second year, and a similar size loss ensued the following year (Searle, 2002) . It faced intense competition for sporting events from the Sydney Cricket Ground and the Sydney Football Stadium, both publicly controlled stadiums. The 21,000 seat SuperDome was also built as a gymnastics and basketball stadium for the Sydney 2000 Olympics at a cost of $A197 million, with state government funding totalling $A142 million (Searle, 2002) . It experienced similar difficulties to Stadium Australia in that it competed directly with the state controlled Sydney Entertainment Centre, an established facility closer to the Sydney CBD, and was estimated to be losing $A5 million annually (Searle, 2002) .
When one examines the international experience of stadium construction, several striking points emerge. Stadiums haven't been profitable, they haven't revitalised the area in which they have been built, and combined public and private ventures haven't been any more successful than publicly funded stadiums.
STADIUMS: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
Over the past decade, stadium construction in New Zealand has undergone a boom period. New stadiums in Auckland, Wellington and Invercargill, as well as several upgrades to existing stadiums across the country have seen in excess of $350 million spent on sporting stadiums. Details of the individual stadium works can be seen in Table 1 . The stadium in question for this study, the Westpac Stadium in Wellington, was built on a 6.5 hectare railyards site in Thorndon, Wellington. Westpac Stadium is a fully enclosed, day/night venue with multiple uses as a sporting venue and as a concert/show venue. The stadium seats 34,500 people, has parking for 850 cars beneath the stadium, and is in very close proximity to the city centre, as well as major transport hubs, including the harbour, railway station and bus terminal. One of the purposes of building the stadium was to attract a variety of events that previously didn't take place in Wellington due to the lack of a suitable facility, events which included major concerts. In recent years, however, the Stadium has attracted major music concerts from performers including Robbie Williams and David Bowie, as well as numerous trade shows, community events and stadium tours. Since its construction, the stadium has attracted a wide variety of events to Wellington. A summary of the events held from January 2000 to June 2003 is shown in Table 2 below. The stadium was viewed as an important factor in the Wellington community even before it had been officially opened. During stadium construction, the stadium attracted so much interest from the public that Fletcher Construction opened a visitor's centre on the site in December 1998 (McConnell, 1998) . Bedford (1998) 5 business leaders in the Wellington region found that employers were expecting improved trading conditions, which was likely to result in future increased employment. Reasons for increased optimism included the construction of the Westpac Stadium and the growth of tourism due to the newly built national museum, Te Papa (Bedford, 1998) .
City

Event
The Business Roundtable commissioned a report into the suitability of government subsidisation of stadiums and sporting events. Cowen's (1999) report observed that no relationship had been found between stadium subsidies and economic growth, employment and tax bases. The report was condemning about the distributional effects of subsidies for stadiums. Several arguments against subsidies were made, including the fact that many proposed social benefits tended to be internalised through mechanisms like ticket sales, and that the multiplier argument typical of economic impact studies blurred expenditure switching and real income creation. Subsidies merely caused spending to be switched from one area of the economy to another and thus subsidies benefitted small special interest groups rather than the taxpaying public (Cowen, 1999) . Johnson (1999) noted that an economic assessment by BERL in 1996 indicated that the construction of the stadium would inject $43 million into the Wellington region and 498 full-time jobs. Information on the Stadium website pointed out that on event days the number of total staff required is 550, including catering staff, security staff and cleaners. For a fully sold event the number required could increase to 600-700 staff. On non-event days, 12 full-time Stadium Trust staff, 15 catering staff and 13 cleaners are employed. There was some reason for scepticism regarding the projected impact of stadium construction on the local Wellington economy. Lilley (1998) noted that of the $80 million in components contracts awarded by December 1998, $60 million were awarded to firms outside Wellington city. The breakdown of this work is shown in Table 3 below. Other firms awarded contracts were based in Bulls, Taranaki, Wairarapa, Palmerston North, Auckland and local subsidiaries of Australian companies (Lilley, 1998) .
Local Area Value of contract work
Ratepayers invested a substantial amount of money into the stadium. The Wellington Regional Council funded $25 million, and the Wellington City Council pledged $15 million, together contributing 33% of the stadium's total cost. The loans were originally intended to be one-off grants however the prediction of surpluses from corporate renewals resulted in the grants becoming non-recourse loans (Aldridge, 7 See http://www.westpacstadium.co.nz/information/facts/who.cfm for details.
6 1997). 8 By way of an international comparison, Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001) pointed out that for the 17 football and baseball stadiums built in the United States in the period 1994-2001, the average public contribution was $188 million, or 66 percent of the total cost. For basketball and hockey arenas the public contribution was 45 percent (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001 ).
In 2000-2001 the Stadium posted a $1.7 million operating surplus in its first financial year of operation (Dominion, 2000) . In 2001-2002 the surplus was $1.15 million. In the 2002-3 financial year the operating surplus was $1.92 million on revenues of almost $14 million (Wellington Regional Stadium Trust, 2003) . Bank debt was $30.6 million, over 200% more than the $15 million forecast in 1997, due to numerous cost overruns including improvements to catering facilities and a $5 million replay screen. Stadium chief executive David Gray said that the bank debt would be fully serviced before the loans from the city and regional councils would be repaid. (Loh Ho-Sang, 2003) . Bank debt was planned to be serviced by a $1.5 million payment each year, taking 20 years to pay off. If a similar repayment schedule was maintained for the public loans, it would take almost 30 years to repay. (Loh Ho-Sang, 2003) .
LITERATURE REVIEW
The measurable fiscal benefits from sports franchises and stadium construction are usually divided into two main areas. Firstly there are the direct effects, usually measured in dollars and cents and jobs created, and secondly, the indirect effects, or the economic ripple effects, that occur as a result of the initial direct stimulus. The measurement of indirect benefits has come under intense scrutiny due to the controversial nature of the multiplier effect.
Caution must be used when evaluating economic impact analyses with multiplier effects and complex input-output models. Studies of economic impact only demonstrate that a reduction in unemployment is a profitable venture (Lavoie, 2000) . Keating (2001) noted several criticisms of economic impact studies, including the fact that the substitution effect of spending is often ignored -that is, a dollar spent at the stadium is likely to be a dollar not spent at other entertainment venues in the city. The possibility of a negative multiplier is also often omitted -that is, what is spent on stadiums could also be spent on other areas such as hospitals, schools etc. The omission of the fact that higher taxes have a dampening effect on the local economy is also common in such studies. Virtually all impact studies measured benefits in forms that were unsuitable for comparisons with public outlays (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001 ). Hudson (2001) sampled thirteen economic impact studies and found that all of the studies tended to use methodologies that would inflate the economic impact of the sports team being studied. The greater the projected economic impact, the more likely that the public would see the project as an important part of economic activity in the local economy, and the greater the chance of public funding being allocated to stadium construction.
In direct contrast to economic impact input-output studies, economists have used a variety of ways to investigate the true economic impact of professional sports teams and stadium construction on local economies.
In their study of assessing the economic impact of sports stadiums in nine metropolitan areas, Baade and Dye (1990) found that the presence of a new or renovated stadium on the economy resulted in uncertain effects on economic activity and possible negative effects on local development relative to the region. They suggested that a reason for such findings might have been that the types of jobs induced by stadium activity tended to be low-wage and seasonal (such as ticket stall attendants, ushers, caterers, restaurant and bar workers, etc). An area development strategy that concentrated on these types of jobs could lead to a situation where the city gained a comparative advantage in low-skilled and seasonal labour. Such a scenario would be potentially detrimental to local area economic growth. Rosentraub (1997) questioned whether the publicity or presence of a sports team led to economic development. It was noted that there was no evidence to support this. Sports teams did not influence location choices, and rated low on the list of factors that influenced business development. This was in direct contrast to the findings of Friedman (1995) , who examined the impact of several location characteristics on the location decisions of the "top" small businesses, and included among quality of life variables was the presence of sports amenities, which included professional and university sport organisations located within or nearby the urbanised area. The results suggested that nearby sport organisations were important. Potential explanations for this result included that it reflected the interests of key employees; or it may have been due to overlapping between the indicator of sports organisations and universities (Friedman, 1995) . Coates and Humphreys (1999) examined the question of whether the sports environment affected the level of real per capita personal income in US cities. Variables representing the sports environment were found to have significant negative influences on real per capita income but the significance was sensitive to model specification. The sports environment was found to have no influence on the growth rate of real per capita income. The authors didn't say that sports were a bad investment -they merely suggested that investment in sports may be justifiable through the contribution sports make to the sense of community and overall satisfaction of residents in a city (Coates and Humphreys, 1999) . Coates and Humphreys (2000) used their 1999 model as the basis for examining the impact of sports on employment and wages in United States cities. They modelled both wages and employment as a function of economy-specific variables, and sports and stadium-specific variables for 37 cities from 1969-1996. Results from their econometric analysis that results suggested that professional sport had a small positive effect on earnings per employee in the Amusements and Recreation sector, but the positive effect was found to be offset by a fall in earnings and employment in other sectors of the economy. The results are not consistent with economic impact studies that proclaim sizeable increases in jobs and earnings in other related sectors of the economy. The authors noted, however, that their results were consistent with Coates and Humphreys (1999) in that the combined effects of the substitution effect of spending and the focus on new low-paying jobs as a result of stadium construction resulted in falls in per capita income. Hudson (1999) , in an effort to develop a model to measure the economic impact of sports and stadiums on local area employment with strong theoretical underpinnings in the economic growth literature, reviewed the literature on urban and regional growth. The consistently important variables in the literature were identified as encompassing market size, labour, energy prices and education levels. Significant results from the model indicated that to employment growth, growth in the cost of labour was negatively related, growth in educated population was positively related, growth in electricity prices was negatively related and growth in per capita income was positively related. The result of particular interest was the impact of sports teams on employment growth, which was not found to be significantly different from zero. The separation of teams into their respective leagues had no impact on the earlier conclusion (Hudson, 1999) . Baade (2000) examined the impact of the Kingdome stadium in Seattle on the local economy of Seattle, and found that the effectiveness of the stadium was dependent on the nature of the economy and how the economy was able to minimise disruption caused by stadium traffic. It was found that businesses experienced lower "regular" business during game days, which potentially offset the gains from additional sportsrelated attendance spending. 11 Results from a similar model used to estimate compensating differentials through wages indicated that there was a 4 percent discount to wages in a city with an NFL franchise, however the results were statistically insignificant at the usual levels of significance. Overall, however, the inclusion of quality-of-life benefits in an analysis could make public spending on stadiums a good investment (Carlino and Coulson, 2002) . 9 The role of the modern stadium was also suggested as a potential source of leakage of spendingmodern stadiums are similar to shopping malls in that they include food courts, which had the effect of lowering spending that would otherwise have been spent outside the stadium in the local neighbourhood. 10 It was also noted that "One could plausibly argue that if these funds [public funds] were spent elsewhere in the economy, either by the government (on a different project) or by consumers (in terms of tax breaks and the resulting consumption spending), the resulting change in overall demand would stimulate new construction projects. Thus, one would not expect public spending on sports stadiums to cause employment in the construction industry to increase." (Millier, 2002, p.172) 11 The study quoted Gyourko and Tracy's (1991) finding that the annual value for just one extra sunny day was $7 per year per household, and Blomquist et al. (1988) found an annual value of $12. This translates into the outcome that an average city of 300,000 households would be willing to pay between $2.1 million and $3.6 million per year for an extra sunny day.
METHODOLOGY
In this section, we outline the models used to evaluate the impact of the Westpac Stadium on the Wellington economy. The aim of this study is to examine firstly whether stadium construction has positively impacted upon employment growth in the Wellington region, and secondly whether there is evidence of an effect on wage growth. If stadium construction is found to have a positive effect on employment and wages then it lends support to those advocates of stadiums as suitable investments to stimulate economic growth.
Employment
The analysis of the employment effects of stadium construction in this paper is derived from a combination of Hudson's (1999) and Miller's (2002) studies. Both types of models were supply-based models, with employment growth determined by economy-and industry-specific variables as well as stadium dummy variables. 
where EMP t is the growth rate of employment in quarter t, LF t is the change in the labour force, W t is the growth rate in wages and salaries, PPIE t is the change in producer price index of electricity as an input, INC t is the change in per capita GDP, INT t is the change in the value of the 90-day bank bill rate, STAD t is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the time periods in which the WestpacTrust Stadium was being constructed and zero otherwise, TEPAPA t is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the periods in which Te Papa was built and zero otherwise, Q t are dummy variables for the first three quarters of the year, TIME is a yearly time trend and e t is a error term. The next step is to provide justification for the selection of these variables. Hudson (1999) found that the market size, energy prices, and education levels of the local labour force were important variables in regional employment growth analyses. Measures of labour force growth and wage growth are included in the market size category, which have been found to be important determinants from the firm's perspective. The less expensive labour is, the more labour will likely be hired, and vice versa. The producer price index of electricity as an input variable is included as a proxy for energy prices, which have been found to be an important negative determinant of employment decisions in previous empirical analyses. The growth in national per capita GDP is also included to capture the influence of nationwide economic performance on the local economy. One would expect that national economic activity strongly influences economic activity in regional economies. If the national economy is doing well, then there may well be linkages to the regions. The close theoretical and empirical relationship between employment and investment is incorporated into this model with the inclusion of the 90 day bank bill rate as a proxy for short term interest rates. The greater the yield on investment, economic theory tells us, the greater investment and employment should be as a result, all other things held constant, an outcome that would be consistent with Miller (2002) . The TEPAPA t variable is included to capture the effect of the construction of the $317 million Museum of New Zealand, Te Papa Tongarewa, which was built in Wellington, from December 1993 to July 1996.
12 Ballingall and Walton (2002) conducted and economic impact analysis establishing the impact of Te Papa on the Wellington region and noted that Te Papa sustained 672 full time equivalent jobs. Without explicitly taking Te Papa's influence in the economy into account, other variables may capture some of this influence. The STAD t variable is the variable of particular interest in this analysis. If it takes a significantly positive value it may provide some justification for arguments that stadium construction boosted employment in the local economy, dependent of course on the size of the effect.
Wages/Salaries
The analysis of the wage and salary effects of stadium construction is derived from a combination of Carlino and Coulson (2002) 
The meanings of the variables are the same as defined above. Again, the principal variable of interest is the STAD t variable. Previous research has found that stadiums have not influenced overall wage growth in any way. The possibility of a wage premium for those people working in an area with a new stadium as discussed in the literature, however, means that this variable is of increased interest. This analysis will shed some light on the question as to whether or not the Stadium did in fact increase wages or whether stadium construction placed a premium on wages. A negative impact on wages could be the result of the outcome suggested by Baade and Dye (1996) , that low skilled and thus low paid jobs were encouraged instead of highskilled, high-paying jobs.
DATA SET
The variables used to estimate equations 1 and 2 in this study are defined in The selection of appropriate variables for model estimation was difficult in several aspects, mainly due to the fact many time series were discontinued midway through the period of analysis, so the number of potential explanatory variables was limited. This combined with a lack of city-specific time series data made the choices difficult. The variables chosen were selected for consistency across the sample period and for ease of interpretation. Employment and earnings data were available for the Wellington region, as was the labour force measure. The electricity cost, GDP and interest rate data were only available at the national level.
The data set used for this analysis consisted of quarterly data from the third quarter of 1989 to the third quarter of 2003, and were obtained from Statistics New Zealand's 13 The difficulty with combining the QES and EES data series was two-fold. Firstly, the data had a sizeable jump from the 1999:3 to the 1999:4 quarter. Secondly, the QES data were in the quarters February, May, August and November, as opposed to the EES which was available in the March, June, September and December quarters. Having the equations defining quarters as 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd quarters eliminates the second concern, and the connection between the two series was made by working out the growth rates from the 1999:3 quarter to the 1999:4 quarter for each of the QES and EES series, using the average growth rate of the two for that period before switching to the EES series. 14 The difficulty with combining the QES and EES data series was two-fold. Firstly, the data had a sizeable jump from the 1999:3 to the 1999:4 quarter. Secondly, the QES data were in the quarters February, May, August and November, as opposed to the EES which was available in the March, June, September and December quarters. Having the equations defining quarters as 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd quarters eliminates the second concern, and the connection between the two series was made by working out the growth rates from the 1999:3 quarter to the 1999:4 quarter for each of the QES and EES series, using the average growth rate of the two for that period before switching to the EES series.
INFOS database. The summary statistics of the variables identified above are shown in Table 5 The tests used for each variable series were augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, computed by econometric software EViews 4.1, and each variable was tested with either: (i) no intercept and no trend, (ii) intercept only (no trend) and (iii) both trend and intercept. As we can see from the above results, the null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected for all cases. Thus the data do not need adjustment for non-stationarity before use in model estimation.
RESULTS
Each of the equations (1) and (2) Both of the estimated models were tested for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, neither of which were found to be present. Considering first the employment results, all of the coefficients have signs that are consistent with their use in similar models in the literature. Only three of the variables, change in the labour force, growth in average weekly total earnings and change in national real GDP per capita, were found to be statistically significantly different from zero. It is interesting to note that both the TEPAPA and the stadium construction variable STAD are positive but statistically insignificant.
Turning to the wages estimation, only two of the coefficients are found to be statistically significant -change in the labour force and growth in full time equivalent employment. Again, both of the TEPAPA and STAD coefficients were positive but not significantly different from zero. These results suggest that neither of the major construction projects influenced either employment or wages at an aggregate level. It is always possible that employment and/or wages in individual sectors may have been significantly influenced, although examining this is beyond the scope of this analysis.
In an attempt to strengthen the explanatory power of the existing models, each equation was re-estimated whilst removing the statistically insignificant variables one-by-one from the equation, the selection of which was determined by redundant variable tests. The resulting models are presented in the tables below. Again, both models were tested for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and neither was found to be present. It is interesting to note that from Tables 9 and 10, compared  to the results in Tables 7 and 8 , the change in interest rate variable was dropped and a core group of statistically significant coefficients emerged. For both the employment and wage equations, change in the labour force, growth in wages or employment (depending upon the dependent variable), change in electricity prices and change in per capita real GDP were all significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level or better. STAD was included to see if there was any noticeable change, however the coefficient remained statistically insignificant. Another variable was added to the reestimated models, POSTSTAD, which is a dummy variable equal to one in each quarter after stadium construction took place. It is interesting to see that for both models the coefficient of POSTSTAD was negative and statistically significant. The results indicate that, post-construction, both employment and wages fell. The results indicate that stadium construction itself was not a significant influence on employment and wage growth in Wellington, however employment and wage growth fell significantly after the stadium was built -indicating that the activity generated by the stadium could have been, at best, a continuation of the growth experienced prior to stadium construction. Thus, it would not be unrealistic to suggest that had the stadium project not taken place, employment and wage growth might possibly have declined sooner than it actually did. Such a suggestion would be consistent with the conclusions of the majority of the literature that stadium construction does not stimulate growth in employment and incomes. In Wellington's case, it would appear from the results of this paper that stadium construction merely delayed a fall in growth.
CONCLUSIONS/FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The findings of this research lend further weight to the argument that stadium construction should not be considered as an economic growth engine. Indeed, results from this econometric analysis of employment growth and wage growth in Wellington suggested that the construction of the Westpac Stadium merely delayed a fall in both employment and wage growth. Such results call into question the suitability and reliability of economic impact studies that project large increases in employment as a result of construction like a mirage of an oasis in a desert at an aggregate level. Economic impact studies don't indicate where jobs come from. If all workers in a project were previously unemployed, then job growth is likely to be both evident and beneficial. If, however, workers are switched from another project to the stadium project, the resulting effect depends upon what project is more beneficial to the local economy. From this study, it would seem that new jobs weren't created in Wellington; rather, they were moved from somewhere else within the local economy. Thus government (and ratepayers) should look closely at what a stadium investment involves, including what benefits they receive. If economic growth is the primary expected benefit through stimulation of employment or wages, then government should look elsewhere for stimulatory projects. This is not to say, however, that stadiums are bad investments. It may well be that benefits lie in other areas. Closer attention needs to be paid to possible flow-on sectors which may be affected by the stadium investment such as retail sales and construction.
Virtually all studies in the literature have found that stadiums do not cause tangible benefits to the economy through such key indicators as income growth, employment or wages. At this point, the debate has turned towards identifying and evaluating the intangible benefits of stadium construction. This is likely to be the subject of interest for future research in this area.
